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Managerial Goals and the Court System:
Some Economic Insights
James A. Brickley*
I.

INTRODUCTION

n comparison to the policies of the Carter Administration, federal fundmg for social programs in the United States during 1985 under the Reagan Administration is projected to drop by $38.5 billion.1 The decline in
government spending on social programs has increased the pressures on
corporations to play a major role in charitable donations.2 Possibly due
in part to this pressure, charitable donations by corporations have increased. During 1983, American corporations gave $3.1 billion, up from
$2.36 billion in 1980.1
While corporations are giving more to charity than ever before,
some argue it is not enough.4 The view held by proponents of increased
corporate giving is that corporations are an important member of society
and have a responsibility to improve that society. Others argue that it is
not desirable for corporations to be major contributors to charity. Their
argument is based on the notion that corporations should maximize profits and let shareholders make charitable decisions at the individual level
with investment profits.
In this paper, I present some economic arguments concerning the
role of the corporation in a free market system. Normative implications
for corporate policy on charitable donations are developed. Second, I
consider the implication of the analysis concerning the role the legal system should play in settling disputes over proper managerial goals and
behavior relating to charitable activities.
The major conclusion of this study is that corporations should not
be major contributors to charity. For a number of reasons, I argue it is
better for corporations to maximize profits and have charitable decisions
made at the individual shareholder level. Corporations may still have
* Professor, Graduate School of Business Administration, University of Rochester (Rochester,
New York). The author would like to thank Sanjai Bhagat, Steven Manaster and especially Ron
Lease for their thoughtful discussions and suggestions. This paper has also benefited from discussions with the participants at the Canada-United States Comparative Corporation Law Conference
(Cleveland, Ohio; October 1984).
1 Simurda, The Giving Habits of Corporate U.S., Salt Lake City Tribune, Oct. 21, 1984 at Fl,
col. 4.
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id.

CANADA-UNITED STATES LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 13:77 1988

some proper role in contributing to charity-to the extent the contribution increases a firm's profits (e.g., through increased goodwill from customers and government).
While I argue that shareholder wealth maximization is the proper
managerial goal, I do not suggest that the court system play a major role
in assuring that managers follow this goal. The costs for managers having to demonstrate to a court that their actions are wealth-maximizing
appear greater than the benefits. Evidence from other studies suggest
that there are market mechanisms (e.g., the takeover market) which help
to assure that managers maximize wealth. The court system would appear to have a role only when those market mechanisms fail.
This paper is organized as follows: In Section II, I present a discussion of some apparent attributes of the free market system. In Section
III, I discuss non-wealth-maximizing goals, such as charity and social
action, within the context of the free market system. In Section IV, I
present arguments concerning the role of the legal system in the area of
managerial goals and actions. The study concludes with a brief
summary.
II. ATTRIBUTES OF A FREE MARKET SYSTEM
It is common to hear terms like "greed," "money hungry," and
"profit maximizer" in describing the modem corporation, and these conjure up a variety of evil images. However, before we condemn the capitalistic system as being heartless and non-socially beneficial, we should
first reflect on some of the positive and socially productive incentives produced by this system.
The goal of wealth maximization produces at least four socially productive incentives. First, it encourages corporations to seek more efficient and less costly means of production. Organizations which survive
in a free market system are those that are able to deliver a given product
at the lowest price to the market.5
Second, wealth maximization encourages firms to target resources
towards the products and services which are most highly valued by the
consumer. For example, if there is a shortage of personal computers and
the price increases, corporations with a competitive advantage in this
area have an incentive to increase computer production. Conversely, if
the computer market is glutted with an over-supply, there is an incentive
to shift production to more profitable products.
Third, the wealth-maximizing system attracts capital to investment
projects and encourages necessary risk-taking. Shareholders are
"residual claimants"; they receive the profits which remain after the
other firm claimants are paid off. If firms did not attempt to maximize
5 See Fama & Jensen, Agency Problems andResidual Claims, 26 J. L. & ECON. 327, 333 (1983).
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wealth, there would be less of an incentive for investors to assume the
risk associated with being a residual claimant.
Finally, the free market system encourages creativity and entrepreneurship. Within the system, individuals have a strong incentive to develop new products and to search for new markets.
Through the capitalistic system, countries like Canada and the
United States generally have produced desired goods and services without central planning. At the same time, these countries have maintained
a high standard of living for their citizens.
III.

THE ROLE OF CORPORATE CHARITY IN
THE FREE MARKET SYSTEM

I have lauded the wealth-maximizing system for being effective in
channeling resources to their most productive end use and in encouraging efficient production. However, what about socially oriented concerns? Aren't social and charitable objectives something that should be
addressed by the modem corporation?
While charitable activities are embraced by many individuals, it is
not clear that corporations should place a major emphasis on supporting
those activities. It is more efficient for corporations to focus on wealth
maximization and to let shareholders make individual charitable
contri6
bution decisions. This is true for at least three reasons.
First, wealth maximization increases the "size of the total pie." By
focusing on this objective, more wealth is created and, therefore, more
can be given to charity if shareholders so choose. Second, there is not
likely to be unanimity among shareholders as to which charities should
be beneficiaries. Contributing at the individual level eliminates this
problem.
Finally (and perhaps most importantly), if corporations are making
major decisions on charitable contributions, the socially beneficial incentives which the free market system creates may be distorted. In particular, investors may have to consider the charitable policies of a
corporation, as well as its economic returns, in making investment decisions. This focus may limit the channeling of resources to their highest
valued end use. Increased "investment boycotts" (similar to the consumer boycotts on lettuce and the products of companies involved in
South Africa) are easy to envision. Non-wealth maximization also will
reduce the incentives for risk-taking among investors. An investor is
more likely to invest as a residual claimant in a company if the value of
his claim is being maximized.
This discussion does not mean that corporations should not engage
in any socially conscious activities. Some charitable activities may benefit the corporation in terms of customer, government, employee, and gen6 See M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962).
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eral public relations. These benefits may translate into economic profits,
making charitable decisions justifiable, wealth-increasing decisions. The
American Law Institute ("A.L.I.") gives the following example.7 An
ongoing company decides to give to a retiring employee who has been
with the company for a long time an annuity to help cover expenses during retirement. It is possible that such a decision can be justified on
purely economic grounds. For example, the morale among existing employees may be increased by this action ("by a company who cares") and
the employees may work harder, thus increasing profits. But the A.L.I.,
while acknowledging that wealth maximization should be the primary
goal, also argues that some corporate charity is justifiable on a purely
"humanitarian basis." I strongly disagree with this view. For instance,
the A.L.I. gives the same example as cited above, except that the company is now being liquidated. 8 Clearly, the action cannot be justified
based on increasing employee morale. The A.L.I. argues that the action
may be justified on "humanitarian" grounds. In the example, the employee was not covered by any company pension plan and had worked
for the company for a long time. Giving him the annuity might be considered the fair and decent thing to do.
I would argue that this action, without shareholder approval, is very
"nonhumanitarian." Perhaps the shareholders, from whom the money is
being taken to give to the employee, are in the same situation as the
employee (i.e., about to retire without a pension plan). In such a case,
the shareholders may have planned for their retirement by investing in
the company. Now the money is being taken from them, without their
consent, and being given to an employee who may or may not have been
wise enough to plan for his retirement (he presumably knew it was coming). Regardless of the actual situations of the shareholders, it is their
money and they should be allowed to choose what to do with it.
IV. THE LEGAL SYSTEM AND CORPORATE GOALS
Given this discussion, one might think that I would favor a hardcore interpretation-that management must be able to demonstrate to
the courts that all of its acts are wealth-maximizing. On the contrary, I
favor the more liberal interpretation that appears to exist currently: that
"reasonable" charitable and ethical activities are permitted by law to be
undertaken by corporations.
As noted above, some charitable and social acts may be conducted
for wealth-maximizing purposes. The direct-dollar benefits for specific
acts are hard to document. It would be unreasonable and overly costly
for managers to demonstrate quantitatively the benefits in each case to a
court.
7 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:

(Tent. Draft No. 2, 1984).
s Id. at 36-40.
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In addition, a strict enforcement of the goal of wealth maximization
by the courts may encourage additional lawsuits by groups of shareholders who own few shares, and simply wish to harass management. The
increased likelihood of lawsuits might make managers overly risk adverse
(i.e., they may forego a wealth-increasing charitable decision in fear of a
lawsuit). Also, the firm's costs for indemnification and insurance for
managers may increase.
The important point is that the legal system is not the only mechanism which protects shareholders and encourages managers to maximize
wealth. There are at least three sets of control mechanisms which help to
discipline managers.
First, there are market control mechanisms. These market mechanisms include the takeover market9 and the managerial labor market.'
If managers sub-optimize, their companies may be taken over and the
managers may be fired. Also, sub-optimizing managers are likely, in the
long run, to command lower wages in the managerial labor market.
A second set of control devices consists of internal monitoring
mechanisms. First, there is the board of directors which acts to monitor
managerial performance. Second, there is monitoring among managers
from the top down as well as from the bottom up. Not only do managers
monitor those below them, but they, too, are being evaluated and monitored by their employees. 11
A third control device is a contract within the firm. For example,
many forms of management compensation contracts are performancecontingent.12 This performance aspect presumably increases the incentive for managers to maximize wealth.
There is a growing body of empirical evidence which supports the
importance of these control mechanisms in disciplining managers. These
studies (which I will summarize) are all "event studies." In an event
study, the researcher examines the stock price reaction to a specific
event. Typically, the researcher collects a large sample of observations
for a given event (e.g., merger announcements). Then, after controlling
for the general stock market movements at the time of announcement, he
examines the average stock market reaction to the announcement of the
event. If the sample is sufficiently large, the effects of random components on the stock returns cancel out and the researcher is left with the
average "abnormal" return around the event in question. The idea behind this procedure is that stock prices are "forward looking." The average stock market reaction to a given event consists of the market's
9 See Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110, 112-13
(1965).
10 See Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288, 295-302
(1980).
11 See id. at 292-95.
12 See id. at 304-05.
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assessment of the effects that the event has on the long run earnings, and
hence the value of the firm.
Table 1 presents a summary of the results of the event studies which
have been conducted on the takeover market. 13 Average abnormal returns for the acquired firm in successful mergers, tender offers, and proxy
fights are presented. In all three cases, the average abnormal return is
large and positive. These findings are consistent with the notion that the
takeover market is an important factor in monitoring managers." When
the resulting stock market reaction is strong and positive, one explanation for the price increase is that the takeover is occurring to replace the
management of a poorly operated company.
Another important control device for managers may be compensation contracts which align the interests of the shareholders and managers. Table 2 presents average abnormal returns for firms increasing their
incentive-based compensations for managers.1 5 The table summarizes
the results of studies concerning long-term incentive compensation plans
and short-term bonus plans.16 The average abnormal return in each case
is positive and statistically significant. The findings are consistent with
the hypothesis that incentive-based compensation plans are an important
factor in motivating managers to work in the interest of shareholders.17
While the evidence suggests that these mechanisms are important in
disciplining managers, other evidence suggests that managers may, on
occasion, take action which harms shareholders. Table 3 presents average abnormal returns around two events which appear to isolate managers from market control mechanisms.18 These actions include the
elimination of cumulative voting and targeted share purchases/stand-still
agreements ("greenmail"). In both cases the average stock return is negative. The evidence suggests that managers may not be disciplined perfectly to work for the shareholders' interests by control mechanisms.
These findings also suggest that the court system may provide, in some
13 Jensen & Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence, 11 J. FIN.
ECON. 5, 7-9 (1983).
14 These results are also consistent with other hypotheses. The positive returns, for example,
may be due to synergy gains from the merger.
Is Brickley, Bhagat & Lease, The Impact of Long-Range ManagerialCompensation Plans on
ShareholderWealth, 7 J. AccT. & ECON. 115, 128 (1985); Tehranian & Waegelein, Market Reaction
to Short Term Executive CompensationPlan Adoption, 7 J. AccT. & ECON. 131 (1985).
16 Long-term incentive plans are based on performance over several years, while short-term
bonus plans are based on a one-year performance.
17 The findings may also reflect tax benefits through tax-motivated sharing plans or positive
information conveyed to the stock market by the managers' actions; see Brickley, Bhagat & Lease,
supra note 15, at 129. For evidence that incentive effects are important, see generally Bhagat,
Brickley & Lease, Incentive Effects of Stock PurchasePlans, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 195 (1985).
18 Bhagat & Brickley, Cumulative Voting: The Value of Minority Shareholder Voting Rights,
27 J. L. & EON. 339, 353-55 (1984); Dann & D'Angelo, StandstillAgreements,PrivatelyNegotiated
Stock Repurchases, and the Marketfor Corporate Control, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 275, 290 (1983); see
generally Bradley & Wakeman, The Wealth Effect of Targeted Share Repurchases, 11 J. FIN. ECON.

301 (1983).
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cases, an alternative means of settling managerial/shareholder conflicts
which are not controlled by market forces.
TABLE 1

AVERAGE ABNORMAL STOCK RETURNS FOR
ACQUIRED FIRMS IN SUCCESSFUL TAKEOVER
ATTEMPTS*
20%
30%

MERGERS

TENDER OFFERS

8%

PROXY FIGHTS
TABLE 2

AVERAGE ABNORMAL STOCK RETURNS FOR FIRMS
INCREASING MANAGERIAL INCENTIVE-BASED
COMPENSATION*
LONG-TERM COMPENSATION PLANS

SHORT-TERM BONUS PLANS

2.4%
3.1%

TABLE 3
AVERAGE ABNORMAL STOCK RETURNS FOR
MANAGERIAL ACTIONS TO ISOLATE THEMSELVES
FROM MARKET CONTROL MECHANISMS*
ELIMINATION OF CUMULATIVE VOTING
STANDSTILL AGREEMENTS/TARGETED REPURCHASES
*

-1.57%

-4.52%

ALL REPORTED ABNORMAL RETURNS
ARE STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT.

V.

CONCLUSION

There is increasing pressure for corporations to increase their level
of charitable donations. This paper presents several economic arguments
against corporations playing a major role in charitable activities. It is
argued that corporations should maximize wealth and leave charitable
decisions to individuals.
It is further argued that the courts should not play a major role in
assuring that managers maximize wealth. The costs of enforcement are
likely to be larger than the benefits. In addition, there are several important control mechanisms which appear to help discipline managers.
These market forces reduce the need for the court system to discipline
managers. However, there is some evidence that these market control
mechanisms do not work perfectly, leaving some role for the court
system.

